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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure-Lowering the Standared for Defendant's
Understanding of his Miranda Rights
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the United States Supreme Court set forth
stringent rules regarding the extent to which a defendant must be in-
formed of his constitutional rights and the procedure for waiver of those
rights. The Court placed a "heavy burden" of proof on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights in the absence of counsel, 2 citing the Johnson v. Zerbst3 test
as the standard to be applied. However, Miranda failed to set forth
exactly how this "heavy burden" could be met by the prosecution, how
the burden differed from the previous "totality of circumstances" test4
for voluntariness of confessions (if at all), and what the police responsi-
bilities were regarding waiver, especially when the defendant indicated
that he misunderstood his rights.5 United States v. Frazier6 is one of a
series of cases that aids in resolving these questions.
Frazier is not a drastic departure from past cases but is a clear
example of the relaxation of the Miranda proof of waiver stan-
dard-from a rather demanding and uncertain standard requiring the
government to prove that the defendant actually understood his rights
to an objective standard requiring proof that the defendant "could have
understood" them.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Frazier, a twenty-eight year old black arrested in connection with
a robbery, was twice read his constitutional rights. He then orally
waived them after being asked if he understood each one, promptly
signed a standard waiver form,7 and just as questioning began, confessed
to a series of robberies in an apparent attempt to clear a friend. As the
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2Id. at 475.
-304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case required that waiver of a constitutional right be voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent, viewing the totality of the circumstances.
'Id. at 464.
'The problem was foreseen b'y early commentators who realized the lower courts would
probably be in no better position to set a standard for sufficiency of the government's proof under
the "heavy burden" mandate than before under Zerbst. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
536, (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 199 (1966).
-476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'Id. at 893 n.3. There was no evidence of any physical coercion, pressure, or disruptive
atmosphere.
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questioning officer began to take notes, Frazier stopped him saying,
"Don't write anything."'8 The officer did not seek to determine whether
Frazier knew his oral statements were admissible against him. The
subsequent conviction, based substantially upon the oral confession, was
appealed on the ground that the defendant had not knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his rights.' The three judge panel remanded the case for
the government to present more evidence on that issue, noting that the
defendant's "ban on note-taking inveighs against intelligent waiver,"" °
but that the government could rebut "the strong implication" by evi-
dence that the police had in some way reacted to this alerting circum-
stance'2 and made sure the defendant actually'3 understood the warn-
ings. On remand the defendant failed to testify to the reason for his
prohibition on note-taking. The government's only significant showings
were the results of a mental examination of Frazier that found him of
average intelligence, and a doctor's opinion that Frazier "could under-
stand and appreciate and comprehend" the meaning of the warnings.)4
The lower court found the prosecution had met its burden and that the
waiver was valid based on the uncontroverted facts of the record. How-
ever, the trial judge gave no express consideration to the effect of Fra-
zier's failure to allow note-taking, despite the emphasis given that point
in the prior court of appeals remand opinion.
On appeal,' 5 a panel of the court of appeals reversed the trial
court,'" making it clear that when an accused exhibits signs of misunder-
ld. at 893.
'Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Ild at 1169,
11Id. at 1168.
""Alerting circumstance" is a term commonly used by the courts to define any activity,
speech, or condition of the accused that could indicate his inability to make a valid waiver, due
either to the inconsistencies of accused's actions or his physical and mental attributes. See United
States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1967).
"The court was of the opinion that Miranda required an "awareness" of the consequences
of waiver in order to make an understanding exercise of the privilege. 419 F.2d at 1168 n.31. The
court thus required the government at least to rebut, if not to foreclose, the possibility that the
defendant misunderstood. Note that the conjecture here as to why the defendant banned note-
taking went in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1168.
"United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 895, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Note that this evidence
went only to the intelligent waiver issue but not necessarily to the knowing waiver issue to be
discussed later.
"Id. at 902 (the three judge panel decision is reported in the appendix to the en bane opinion).
111d. at 906. The court of appeals originally remanded the case as an opportunity for the
government to introduce evidence that the police did respond to defendant's remarks on note-
taking and that they thereafter explained more fully to defendant his rights, fulfilling their duty
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
standing his rights, it is the duty of the police to ensure that the accused
can make an informed decision." On rehearing en banc, the trial court's
findings were reinstated. The full court reasoned that the government
had met the burden imposed by Miranda by proof (1) that the warnings
were given properly and (2) that the person warned was capable of
understanding them.18 The court asserted that the burden then shifts to
the defendant to prove that the "alerting circumstance," here the ban
on note-taking, arose from misunderstanding of his rights," not from
some unrelated cause. Conjecture about the reason for the ban is now
allowed in his favor-he must offer proof."0 But the defendant here did
not testify-he failed to offer the most persuasive proof at his disposal.
If he had, the decision may well have been different. The court expressed
the belief that the police should not be held responsible for analysing
the actions of the defendant or for placing legal interpretations on the
Miranda warnings.2 '
The court, faced with a "normal" defendant22 and an "alerting
circumstance," applied an objective test, requiring the prosecution to
prove only that the defendant could have understood the warnings. It
then shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that he actually did
misunderstand. This test appears to be a far cry from the "heavy burden
under Miranda. The burden was on the government to rebut the presumption of misunderstanding,
but the government addressed no new evidence to that issue. The government showed only that
Frazier "could have understood."
211d. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938); United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Washing.
ton, 341 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1965); In re Lawrence, 29 N.Y.2d 206, 325 N.Y.S.2d 921, 275 N.E.2d
577 (1971): N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSIONS STANDARD-MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 69 (1966); 19
AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcTS § 5 at 12, § 8 at 18, § I I at 21 (1967); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police
Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers- Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NOTRE DA, E LAWYER
479, 490 (1967). The Frazier court added that speculation as to why the defendant banned note-
taking "cannot meet the Government's burden . . . of rebutting with affirmative and convincing
evidence the inference that appellant did not validly waive his privilege." 476 F.2d at 905-06.
11476 F.2d at 897-98.
"The court admitted that even where capacity exists, misunderstanding can still occur, Id. at
897.
2This sharply contrasts with the original decision forbidding conjecture in the government's
favor. Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21"When the police have, as hare, faithfully followed the exact procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court, inferior courts should be slow to mandate, after the fact, enlarging responsibilities
alien to the duties and the training of policemen." 476 F.2d at 899. The court seemed especially
ready to limit police responsibility where there were no signs of police coercion Miranda was
intended to discourage.
"The defendant was of average intelligence, sufficient age, not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, not emotionally upset, not interrogated or held at length, and not physically coerced.
[Vol. 52
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of proof" originally promulgated in Miranda and alarmingly close to
permitting the ritualistic reading of the rights deplored in that deci-
sion.2?
FIFTH AMENDMENT WAIVER UNDER MIRANDA
Miranda speaks of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in very strong terms, requiring "real understanding and
intelligent exercise of the privilege. ' 24 It directs not only that a state-
ment of the rights be given, but also that they be understood. 25 The
government was given this additional responsibility of insuring under-
standing essentially for two reasons: to mitigate the inherently coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogation, in which the accused's adver-
saries are in complete control; and to require the government to respect
the dignity of the individual and thereby maintain the delicate state-
individual balance-the main purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination.26
The courts reach the question of the defendant's understanding of
his rights most often when considering the waiver issue, since other
alleged violations of the Miranda rules focus more on police conduct
than on defendant reaction. Johnson v. Zerbst,2 cited in Miranda,28
required proof of a voluntary, knowing, 29 and intelligent 0 waiver of a
constitutional right viewing the totality of the circumstances3, and en-
couraged "every reasonable presumption against waiver .... , ",32 In
pre-Miranda applications of Zerbst to determine voluntariness of con-
3384 U.S. at 476.
' d. at 469. The court went on to say "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. . . a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from silence of the accused .. " Id. at 475. Also, any evidence of trickery or
cajolery to obtain waiver will show the defendant did not voluntarily waive his rights.
--See generally N. SOBEL, supra note 17, at 69; 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FACTS § 5 at 12, § 8
at 18, § II at 21 (1967); Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 17, at 490.
21384 U.S. at 460; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1964); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2251 (J. MeNaughton rev. 1961).
-'304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21384 U.S. at 475.
- 304 U.S. at 465. Knowing waiver requires the defendant to waive his rights with complete
knowledge, awareness, and cognition of what he is doing. See generally 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF
FACTS § 29 at 52 (1967).
11304 U.S. at 465. Intelligent waiver requires the defendant to possess sufficient intellectual
ability to comprehend the meaning and significance of the warnings and the capacity to make a
competent decision. See generally AM. JuR., PROOF OF FACTS § 31 at 55 (1967).
1'304 U.S. at 463-65.
32Id. at 464.
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fessions, courts considered the same types of circumstances that post-
Miranda courts consider in determining knowing waiver. 33 Many cases
examine whether the accused had the capacity to understand and waive
his rights because of his age, intelligence, background, physical state,
length of detention, or physical treatment. 34
Faced with considering the "totality of the circumstances" and
evaluating it to determine if the "heavy burden" imposed by Miranda
had been met, most courts were reluctant to set a standard that the
Supreme Court had left undefined. Some courts merely stated that the
burden had been met and set no standard at all;35 others said that they
simply believed police witnesses, 3 and defendants continually lost
"swearing contests ' 37 because of the greater credence given police testi-
mony.3 Judges, attorneys, and police officials alike were aware of the
uncertainties involved in Miranda's failure to define the standard of
proof required. 39 Judges balked at requiring the state to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused actually understood the warnings,
since the state often had little evidence besides the defendant's attributes
and police testimony. Attorneys balked at depending upon decisional
'See N. SOBEL, supra note 17, at 12; Warden, Miranda-Some History,jSome Observa-
lions, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 39, 54 (1966).
3'See Leighton v. Cox, 365 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1966); Annot., 22 L. Ed. 2d 872, 878-79 (1970);
Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45 DENVER L.J. 427, 454 (1968).
'See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 392 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968). See also United States v.
Folette, 393 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968); Hodge v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968); Griffin
v. State, 116 Ga. App. 429, 157 S.E.2d 894 (1967); State v. McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158 S.E.2d
874 (1968): Note, Aftermath of Miranda-The Courts Grapple With Burden Of Proof, 71 W. VA.
L. REv. 180, 181 (1969); cf. Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968).
-See, e.g., Parish v. State, 117 Ga. App. 616, 618, 161 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1968).
'See, e.g., Lathers v. United States 396 F.2d 524, 533 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Anderson, 394 F.2d 743, 746 (2d Cir. 1968); Green v. State, 223 Ga. 611, 613, 157 S.E.2d 257,
259 (1967); State v. Clyburn, 273 N.C. 284, 290, 159 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1968). See also Warden,
supra note 33, at 35.
'See Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 645, 658-59 (1967). At the other extreme were several commentators and cases interpreting
Miranda as requiring a presumption in favor of the accused. See B. GEORGE, Jr., CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 291 (1973); Rogge, Proof by Confession, 12 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1966); Comment, Custodial Interrogation as a Tool of Law Enforcement; Miranda v.
Arizona and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 253, 262 (1967).
"'See Note, Constitutional Law-Self Incrimination-Right To Counsel To Protect The
Fifth Amendment Privilege, 16 AM. U.L. REV. 141 (1966); Note, Criminal Law-Confessions
-The Restraints Society Must Observe Consistent with the Federal Constitution in Interrogating
Suspects, 18 S.C.L. REV. 853 (1966); Note, Intoxicated Confessions: A New Haven in Miranda?,
20 STAN. L. REV. 1269 (1968); Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; The Scope and
Application of Miranda, 37 UMKC L. REV. 260, 299 (1969); Comment, Miranda and Waiver, 4
WILLAMETTE L.J. 205 (1966).
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law because each case turned on its own facts 0 with few circumstances4"
seeming to command more weight than the others. Police officials,
believing the new warnings would impede police interrogation tech-
niques, were not sure whether they were commanded to "serve as attor-
ney" to an accused by explaining his rights to him when he refused
counsel. In such a setting, and with other cases limiting Miranda in
other areas,42 United States v. Frazier takes on special significance.
THE ABSENCE OF UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
First of all, the case deals with a "normal" defendant. Innumerable
cases have dealt with defendants who because of wounds,4 3 injuries,"
seizures,"5 narcotics," or liquor,47 to name only a few, might have been
incapable of the awareness required for an understanding and knowing
waiver. Equally as many cases have dealt with defendants, who because
of age,4" mental capacity,49 prior contact with police 0 or lengthy interro-
gation,5' made rather clearly unintelligent waivers. Frazier fell into none
of these categories. He was middle-aged, reasonably healthy, and of
average intelligence, as the court found on remand. He had no external
"excuse" for misunderstanding the warnings. Since Frazier considers a
defendant without any infirmities to cloud the "totality of circumstan-
"Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
"These circumstances are lengthy interrogation, incommunicado incarceration, and the fact
that the admission or confession did not "follow closely" the giving of the warnings. See generally
19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcrs § 36-39 (1967).
42Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (determination f a confession's voluntariness by
preponderance of evidence was not a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (otherwise inadmissible confessions usable for impeachment
purposes if trustworthy).
"See People v. Miller, 135 Cal. 69, 67 P. 12 (1901).
"See State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 92-96, 115 A.2d 62, 79-81 (1955).
"sSee People v. Baksys, 26 App. Div. 2d 648, 272 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1966).
"See United States ex rel. Townsend v. Sain, 276 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. Cobb,
45 Cal. 2d 158, 287 P.2d 752 (1955); People v. Waack, 100 Cal. App. 2d 253, 223 P.2d 486 (1950);
State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122 P. 748 (1912).
"
7See People v. Townsend, 1 111. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729 (1957). See generally Annot., 22 L.
Ed. 2d 872, 878-79 (1970).
"See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). See generally Annot., A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960);
19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcrs § 32 at 56 (1967).
"See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcTs § 33 at 58 (1967).
"See United States v. Bolden, 355 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally 19 AM. JUR., PROOF
OF FAcTs § 34 at 61 (1967).
5"This is the very activity Miranda itself violently condemns. See also Ziang Sung Wan
v. United States, 266 U.S. i (1924); 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FACrS §§ 36, 37 (1967).
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ces" test, the decision offers insights into both the protections of the
accused and the burden of proof placed on the government when the
accused who has allegedly misunderstood his rights 2 is "normal" and
the circumstances of the waiver and confession are not suspect. The
confession and waiver in Frazier were obtained without long or incom-
municado interrogation, without the "third degree" and without prom-
ises or threats-all circumstances Miranda enumerated as militating
against waiver.53
THE ALERTING CIRCUMSTANCE
An accused can rarely expect to nullify an express waiver and
confession simply by testifying that he misunderstood his rights, 4 nor
can he expect the police to detect the misunderstanding of clearly given
warnings"' without some indicator. The cases become more favorable to
the defendants when an additional "alerting circumstance" appears.
Various acts of the accused have been found to serve as such indicators.
The most common has been the accused's refusal to sign a waiver or
confession, while remaining willing to confess orally." Although some
5rrhe court recognized the fact that people with the capacity to understand the warnings still
might not. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Statistical studies have
determined that a high percentage of the average population, even without the pressures of arrest,
misunderstands the basic rights given in the Miranda warnings. Doubtless then, many defendants
of average capacities could misunderstand their rights. See Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Micli. L.
REV. 1347, 1374 (1968) (15% misunderstood warnings regarding the privilege against self-
incrimination); Griffiths, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,
77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967) (majority of those interviewed misunderstood rights from mere warnings
read to them).
0384 U.S. at 475-76.
5See Warden, supra note 33, at 55. This writer has discovered no cases so holding in a
thorough examination of post-Miranda cases. However, commentators (soon after Miranda was
decided) thought this might be possible, reading Miranda literally and believing the heavy burden
to be approaching a presumption of inadmissibility. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 534
(1966); (White, J., dissenting); B. GEORGE, JR., supra note 38. See also Rogge, supra note 38;
Comment, 21 Sw. L.J., supra note 38, at 262; Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra note 39, at
303.
'Cases in which the warnings have been improperly given provide an entirely different basis
for claiming exclusion of a confession-violation of the very clear cut rules set down in Miranda.
Courts have readily excluded evidence in this area where the standard is clear and easily applied.
See, e.g., United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
SSee, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v.
McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); !ettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 888 (1968); United States
v. Bird, 293 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Mont. 1968); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968).
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courts have held the contradictory nature of this single act imposes an
additional duty upon the police to recognize the defendant's possible
misunderstanding about the admissibility of oral statements, 57 most
have held the opposite view."8 Though on first sight, Frazier would seem
to fall in line with these decisions, it is important not to lump it too
readily with these "refusal-to-sign-waiver" cases. First, courts have not
given much weight to this refusal, reasoning that if Miranda rejects the
signing of a waiver as conclusive proof of waiver59 then the police and
court have no duty to recognize failure to sign (standing alone) as a
conclusive indicator of misunderstanding or invalid waiver." Secondly,
the indicator in Frazier stands alone without any other evidence mitigat-
ing against the possibility of misunderstanding, unlike most of the "re-
fusal to sign" cases.6
Despite the fact that the "refusal to sign" cases may turn on distin-
guishable principles and facts, they are enlightening in the standard of
police conduct that they set in contrast to Frazier. Some have intro-
duced the "reasonable man" standard-if a reasonable police officer
would recognize the alerting circumstance as evidence of failure to com-
prehend, he has an additional duty to insure understanding. 2 Frazier
makes it clear that no such standard exists. After the warnings have
been given in the proper manner, without impeding circumstances, and
the accused has openly admitted his understanding, the police need not
evaluate the situation further.6 3 Frazier is not the first case to adopt this
proposition, 4 but it is the first case so to hold without some additional
evidence (such as defendant's prior contact with the law or the giving
of his confession in such a way as to make it obvious that he knew it
5 See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Bird, 293
F. Supp. 1265 (D. Mont. 1968); People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114
(1970).
'See, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); Pettyjohn v. United
States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1968);
Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra note 39, at 307.
-P384 U.S. at 475.
CUnited States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815
(Mo. 1968); Land v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 223, 176 S.E,2d 586 (1970).
aSee, e.g., Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Ruth,
394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 888 (1968).
2United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion); accord, United
States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cit. 1968). But see Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra
note 39, at 307.
63United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
1973]
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was admissible) to mitigate the possibility that the defendant misunder-
stood. Therefore, in Frazier the court has set the first clearly demonstra-
tive standard for police responsibility in insuring understanding of the
Miranda warnings-when faced with a "normal" accused, the police
must comply with the letter of the Miranda warnings, but they need not
indulge in interpretations of the defendant's conduct relating to his
possible misunderstanding when he states that he understands his rights.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
It would be misleading to believe that the Frazier standard of police
responsibility is unrelated to the job of the prosecutor. If the police are
required to exercise very limited responsibility to insure actual under-
standing, can the prosecution meet its "heavy burden" of proof? Since
each case turns on its own facts,"5 cases are difficult to analogize; how-
ever, several general theories have been advanced. Some give any rea-
sonable doubt to the defendant on the misunderstanding issue;6 some
accept proof of capacity to understand unless there is an alerting cir-
cumstance which then raises the government's burden;"1 some express
discomfort at having to make a determination on actual understand-
ing; 8 some say the defendant simply cannot claim misunderstanding
after a signed waiver without more proof;6, some consider an alerting
circumstance, such as calling a lawyer, the equivalent of an expression
of desire to cease the questioning, bypassing the waiver issue entirely;"
but those most closely analogous to Frazier employ the burden shifting
theory,71 usually without expressing it in those terms.
Frazier is an excellent example of the theory in its simplest form.
The prosecutor cannot be expected to offer evidence to negate every
possible circumstance that might imply misunderstanding; 72 he does not
'Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
"See, e.g., United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
"See, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970).
"See, e.g., Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870
(1968).
"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970).
7"People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114 (1970), 83 Cal. Rptr. 658.
"United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968).
7Such a burden on the prosecution would require the courts to give the defendant the benefit
of conjecture. The three judge panel in Frazier believed that the defendant was entitled to such a
benefit since actual understanding was involved. 476 F.2d at 905-06. The later opinion of the court
en banc reversed that position, refusing to speculate in the defendant's favor. 476 F.2d at 898.
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have access to the only source of first hand evidence bearing on actual
understanding-testimony of the defendant. Therefore the government
is only required to present a prima facie case for waiver by showing that
the defendant was uncoerced, intelligent enough to comprehend the
warnings, and sufficiently informed of his rights to be capable of a
knowing choice of action.7 3 The defendant then must rebut the prima
facie case. 74 Often, his only means is his own testimony 5 since he had
no counsel present during interrogation. As a practical matter, what the
defendant can say will be very limited-he will merely state that he
misunderstood his rights. The court will then be left with weighing the
evidence of capacity to understand against the defendant's testimony of
misunderstanding.
All this boils down to a neatly objective test of waiver in which the
government need only prove the capacity to understand (a far cry from
the "heavy burden" of establishing actual knowledge originally called
for in Miranda). There is one major reservation. The court implied that
the decision might well have been different had the defendant testified,
but in fact, that may not be true at all. In United States v. McNeil,71
on facts similar to Frazier (except that the "alerting circumstance" was
refusal to sign a waiver), defendant's testimony that he misunderstood
his rights had no effect on the outcome. The same is true in Pettyjohn
v. United States.77 And in Frazier itself, the court's finding that the
police had fulfilled all of their responsibilities toward Frazier conflicts
with the later language about the defendant's failure to testify. The court
has given its blessing to a very objective set of police procedures and
responsibilities 7 (intimating that if faced with such a situation again, the
police could use the same procedure) which would be employed long
before it was known whether the defendant would testify. 7 This would
seem" to indicate that the police will not violate any of the defendant's
constitutional rights by failing to recognize the possible misunderstan-
"State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Mo. 1968). This is exactly what the court proved in
Frazier.
"This is referring only to a case like Frazier-one without any of the infirmities or coercive
circumstances discussed earlier.
"Either because of error of counsel of decision of the defendant, Frazier did not testify.
76433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970).
71476 F.2d at 892, 899.
"Seemingly the court would not have so vigorously defended the police actions (the opinion
even refers to it as "having important implications with respect to judicial definition of the respon-
sibilities of law enforcement officers . . ." id. at 892) if the procedures could so easily have been
found inadequate simply because the defendant testified that he misunderstood.
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ding. However, if the accused can obtain exclusion of his confession by
testifying, one of his rights must have been violated. It is inconsistent
for the court to condone this limit on police responsibility and still
exclude the confession, since such use of the exclusionary rule would
encourage the police to go further than the court seems to require to
insure understanding. Certainly the court would not encourage such a
paradox of police motivation. Therefore, Frazier's objective standards
of proof of waiver and police responsibility are not likely to be over-
turned by defendant's testimony, even though the case spoke of its
importance.
CONCLUSION
The reasons Frazier reached such a decision on the standards of
proof and police conduct are speculative. The case may reflect the view
that now Chief Justice Burger took in the dissent to Frazier's original
appeal" and echoed in the final decision-Miranda and the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination are to prevent compulsive self-
incrimination and where, as in Frazier, that end has been served, confes-
sions should not be excluded because of possible minor infringement on
the means by which they were obtained. The decision could reflect the
view evident in other opinions 8-that it is necessary for the defendant
to make a voluntary decision but not necessarily a wise one. It could
signal a gradual softening of the Miranda stringencies in the face of the
old, but recurring complaints about the exclusionary rule.81 In any case,
United States v. Frazier sets forth both a clearly objective, burden-
shifting test as to proof of waiver-a significant diminution of the
"heavy burden" mentioned in Miranda, and an equally objective stan-
dard of police conduct regarding waiver. Frazier makes waiver under
Miranda a more discernable facet of the law, even though it may have
eroded part of Miranda's defendant-benefiting rules in the process.
ROBERT SHERWOOD LILIEN
"Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., dissenting),
"
1See United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972).
"Cases cited note 42 supra. See People v. Artuello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 423 P.2d 202, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 274 (1967) (courts allowing certain types of trickery absolutely banned by Miranda); Elsen
& Rosett, supra note 38, at 667-68; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 2d 772, 786 (1965).
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